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China has declared a war on terrorism in Xinjiang, identifying violence in the 
region as a top security threat. However, what nowadays is officially 
constructed as terrorism used to be framed as counter-revolution in the past. 
Informed by the concept of macrosecuritization and the agenda of critical 
terrorism studies (CTS), this article examines the changing nature of the 
Chinese state framing of violence in Xinjiang. Through a comparative analysis 
of the discursive construction of the Baren (1990) and Bachu (2013) violent 
incidents, I find that the terror lexicon has replaced old narratives of counter-
revolution only to legitimize a sustained crackdown under a novel geopolitical 
context. The construction of violence in Xinjiang as terrorism, I argue, is 
contingent, limited, and unstable. It marginalizes factors other than an 
extremist or separatist agency in the incubation of the violence, in particular 
the frictions created by the crackdown with which the Chinese government is 
trying to placate the unrest.   
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There was a time when there was no terrorism in Xinjiang, not because there was no 
socio-political violence in the region, but because the label was absent in the Chinese 
state’s construction of the phenomenon. When violence rocked the Baren township in 
1990, the Chinese state media described the events as a ‘counter-revolutionary 
rebellion’ (BBCMSAP 1990a). When riots erupted in Ghulja in 1997, Chinese 
officials framed them as ‘a practice of beating, smashing, and looting’ pursuing 
separatism (AFP 1997b). Official depictions changed after the September 11th 2001 
(9/11) attacks in New York, when the language of terrorism became the dominant 
vernacular in Chinese security narratives about Xinjiang. This included the 
retrospective recasting (Tilly 2002) of past violent events. An official report published 
in 2002 re-articulated the Baren and Ghulja incidents as the work of ‘terrorist 
organizations’ (Information Office of the State Council of the PRC 2002). The 
linguistic shift in the government’s framing of violence in Xinjiang illustrates the 
franchising of the ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWoT) to countries other than the US, 
Afghanistan or Iraq, original spheres of the conflict. From Chechnya to the 
Philippines, the ‘war on terror’ discourse has been imported by governments to 
legitimize their responses to domestic insurgencies or dissidences with a history 
which long predates 9/11 (Russell 2005; Santos 2010). This seminal episode also 
catalyzed a growing academic interest in the political implications of discursive 
constructions of terrorism threats, particularly the GWoT and its ramifications 




Drawing on conceptual insights from securitization theory and the agenda of 
critical terrorism studies, this article contributes to this literature by investigating the 
social construction of violent events by the Chinese state from a historical 
perspective. In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), long-standing 
frictions between the Chinese government and the Uyghur ethnic minority have 
resulted in periodical violent outbursts. In the past decade, these have ranged from 
clashes between protesters and the Chinese security forces to indiscriminate attacks 
against civilians. I argue that the contemporary Chinese state discourse constructing 
these events as terrorism is historically contingent and oversimplifies the causes of the 
violence. As the article shows, a language of terrorism has replaced the representation 
of violence as counter-revolution. This is window-dressing the government’s past 
framing of violent events to uphold a state of emergency in Xinjiang within a new 
geopolitical context. The change of language is not simply the result of altered violent 
patterns in the region but rather a reflection of a change in what legitimation claims 
for the use of force by governments domestically are accepted at the international 
level. The article also demonstrates that the discourse of terrorism in Xinjiang is open 
to contestation. Chinese state accounts of violence in the region have been challenged 
by alternative interpretations (Poch 2007; Grammaticas 2013; Haas 2015). As I 
highlight, these counter-narratives undermine the government’s attempts to justify 
crackdown policies by attaching the terrorism label to violence. 
 
The article proceeds in four sections. First, it overviews the discursive turn in 
the study of security and terrorism, underscoring the capacity of narratives to justify 
political responses. The second section contextualizes the post-9/11 contagion of the 
language of terrorism into the Chinese state’s construction of violence in Xinjiang. 
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Next, the article examines the official narratives interpreting and representing the 
Baren ‘counter-revolutionary rebellion’ (1990) and the Bachu ‘terrorist’ attack 
(2013). Finally, I conduct a comparative analysis of these narratives, and reflect on 
the productive nature of the Chinese state discourse and the political consequences it 
has for Xinjiang and the Uyghurs.  	
The Study of Terrorism as Discourse 
 
The study of how security threats, including terrorism, are constructed and used by 
political actors to advance their agendas has been greatly influenced by empirical 
developments. In the case of security studies, the Cold War, and in particular the 
inability of analytical frameworks based in the ‘study of the threat, use, and control of 
military force’ (Walt 1991, 212) to predict its end, facilitated an evolution of the field 
into new directions (see Buzan and Hansen 2009). In this context, some scholars 
shifted the focus from the strategic analysis of the material capabilities of the state, to 
the linguistic turn of Western philosophy for the study of security (Mutlu and Salter 
2013); with an interest in investigating how political discourses construct ‘social 
realities’ (Milliken 1999: 229-230), amongst them security threats and terrorism. 
Here, the work of the Copenhagen School is a case in point for understanding how 
governments avid to legitimize their domestic policies in front of international 
audiences have imported the GWoT discourse. Buzan and Wæver (2003, 491) defined 
securitization as the process through which a state actor can transform an issue into a 
security threat to ‘enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures’ to deal with it. In 
their further exploration of the concept, they found that some threats are constructed 
on such ‘universalist’ grounds, as threatening referent objects as wide as the whole of 
5 	
 5 
the humankind, that they create a global conflict within which other micro-conflicts 
can be framed (Buzan and Wæver 2009). An example of this process, named 
macrosecuritization, took place during the Cold War when Latin American conflicts 
that had nothing to do with communism were re-phrased as part of the US-Soviet 
tensions (Buzan and Wæver 2009, 253). The GWoT discourse has emerged as another 
macrosecuritization paradigm within which actors other than the US, including 
China, have used the international threat of terrorism to re-frame localized conflicts 
not formerly represented as such.   
 
Meanwhile, the 9/11 events catalysed a turning point in the study of terrorism. 
In this case, scholars concerned with the analytical and methodological shortcomings 
of the field (see Stampnitzky 2001; Schmid and Jongman 1988; Silke 2001), made 
evident with the post-9/11 explosion of literature on terrorism (see Shivani 2007; 
Boyle 2012) have advanced a focus on the study of terrorism as discourse (Breen 
Smyth 2007; Jarvis 2009).  Concerns with the productive power of the language of 
terrorism are not a new post-9/11 phenomenon. Chomsky (1987, 190) had examined 
the biased nature of the American discourse of terrorism, in which only attacks by 
Arabs were represented as the ‘evil scourge of terrorism’. Meanwhile, Zulaika and 
Douglas (1996, 4) had questioned the ‘absolutist framework within which terrorism 
discourse casts its characters and networks’. The discursive approach to the study of 
terrorism gained momentum after the launching of the GWoT, as the political power 
of the label was noticed in political and academic circles (Schmid 2004: 397; UN 
2002, 6). From a critical perspective, scholars have explored how the language used 
to construct the GWoT enabled the international military campaign  (Silberstein 2004; 
Jackson 2005). The more consistent effort to validate this approach has come from an 
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emerging agenda of critical terrorism studies sensitive to the status of terrorism as 
‘one of the most powerful signifiers in contemporary discourse’ (Breen Smyth et al. 
2008, 1). From this vantage, scholars have promoted the study of the social 
construction of ‘an issue, individual, states, regions, races and ethnicities, religion, 
etc. as terrorist’ (Dixit and Stump 2013: 23), or the use of the language of terrorism, 
to discredit the domestic opposition and legitimize counter-terrorist policies (Gunning 
2007, 377; Jarvis 2009, 19). 
 
 Approaches to terrorism as discourse are based on four major tenets guiding 
this study. First, terrorism is understood as a social construction. As Turk (2004, 271) 
puts it, terrorism is ‘not a given in the real world, but an interpretation of events and 
their presumed causes’. In other words, there is nothing physically intrinsic about acts 
of terrorism; it is only through narratives that certain meanings are attached to brute 
violence (see Milliken 1999) The second tenet is that the language of terrorism has 
productive power. Discourses are instrumental and conducive to specific political 
outcomes. As Yee (1996, 95-6) explains, they supply ‘policy makers with meaning of 
their political situations’, and ‘authorize or restrict, as well as prioritize and distribute, 
the ideas and beliefs that policymakers can think’. As Turk (2004, 272) suggests, 
‘there are political, economic and military implications’ in ‘naming particular entities 
as terrorists’. A third tenet is that discourses are historically contingent. They are a 
product of their time, articulated according to specific socio-political structures, so 
they change with evolving socio-historical contexts (Milliken 1999). Finally, and 
despite their apparent hegemonic nature, dominant discourses are always open to 
destabilization and contestation (Jackson 2005). These four elements can be found in 




The Franchising of the ‘War on Terror’ Discourse into China 
 
One of the themes explored in the literature analyzing the GWoT discourse is the 
contagion of its language and beliefs into settings other than the American military 
campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Noticing the political ramifications of this 
transmission, Jackson (2005, 13) suggested that some countries had ‘adopted the 
language of the War on Terror to describe their fight against internal insurgencies and 
dissidents’. This, as Fierke (2005, 56) pointed out, equalled to ‘subsuming a range of 
more localized conflicts, with their own distinct histories, and histories of grievance’. 
To Bhatia (2005, 13), there was an ‘interest of some quasi-authoritarian governments 
to over-emphasise the militant Islamist character of their opposition, in the hope of 
US assistance or a carte blanche for repression’.  Bhatia cited the cases of 
Uzbekistan, Egypt and Algeria as locations for the franchising of the GWoT. The list 
of countries is longer. In Morocco, the government has linked moderate Islamist 
groups and the Western Sahara independence movement to a global terrorist threat, so 
as to legitimize a crackdown (Bartolucci 2010). Meanwhile, the Sri Lankan 
government used the terror label to undermine the Tamil self-determination project in 
the international arena, jeopardizing a peaceful solution to the conflict  (Nadarajah 
and Sriskandarajah 2005).	 In Russia, the conflation of Chechen aspirations to 
independence with Islamic terrorism by the Putin administrations eclipses the 
historical complexity of the region (Russell 2005). In the Philippines, the application 
of the ‘war on terrorism’ lens to the conflict of Mindanao disregards the ethno-
nationalist and territorial dimensions of the Moro rebellion, promoting a military 




The political tremors of 9/11 were immediately felt in China. Following the 
attacks in New York, Chinese officials re-framed Uyghur unrest in Xinjiang as a 
terrorist threat similar to that faced by the US. In a conversation with US president 
George W. Bush, China’s president Jiang Zemin described 9/11 as ‘not only a disaster 
to the US people but also a challenge to the world’ (MacAskill, Traynor, and Gittings 
2001). Meanwhile, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi claimed that the 
activities of ‘Eastern Turkistan elements’, in reference to dissidents in Xinjiang, were 
a ‘global scourge’, and added that fighting the ‘Eastern Turkistan terrorist forces’ 
should become ‘a part of the international efforts’ against terrorism (AFP 2001b). 
Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan repeated these arguments in international 
forums. In the 2001 annual debate of the UN General Assembly, he emphasized that 
‘the fight against the East Turkestan group’ was ‘an important aspect of the 
international fight against terrorism’ (AFP 2001a). During the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Forum summit, he maintained that Uyghur separatists had been trained 
in an Afghan camp established by Bin Laden (BBCMAPP 2001b). In front of the UN 
Security Council (UNSC), he argued, in reference to Xinjiang, that ‘terrorism’ was 
‘the common enemy of all mankind’ (BBCMAPP 2001a). These efforts were 
legitimized in some international quarters. In 2002, the US and the UNSC included 
the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a little known organization that China 
claimed was part of the ‘Eastern Turkistan terrorist forces’, on their lists of terrorist 
organizations (AI 2002).   
To be exact, the use of the terror lexicon was not entirely alien to the Chinese 
discourse on violence in Xinjiang before 2001. The adoption of the ‘war on terror’ 
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discourse overtook the previous construction of terrorism, separatism, and religious 
extremism as major threats in Central Asia. This process started in 1996 when the 
Shanghai Five - embryo of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) formed by 
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan - signed a treaty aimed at 
‘strengthening trust and disarmament’ in their borders, confirming years of Chinese 
rapprochement to the region (Clarke 2003). After the signing, the Chinese authorities 
started to introduce the vocabulary of terrorism into their narratives about Xinjiang. In 
1996, Xinjiang governor Adbulahat Abdurixit blamed ‘ethnic separatists and illegal 
religious activities’ for ‘a number of violent terrorist cases’ (BBCMSAP 1996b). In 
1997, the government revised the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(1979) and the category of ‘crimes of counter-revolution’ was reframed as ‘crimes of 
endangering state security’, which included those ‘in the nature of terrorist activities’ 
(AFP 1997a). In 2001, weeks before 9/11, the SCO signed a convention to ‘combat 
terrorism, separatism and extremism’ (SCO 2001). This threat would be later 
conceptualized as the ‘three evil forces’ (Xinhua 2004), a rhetorical device by which 
the Chinese state equates and conflates as a single threat the use of violent means, a 
separatist agenda, and so-called ‘extremist’ religious practices. Nevertheless, the 
threat of terrorism remained a secondary issue for the Chinese authorities: a white 
paper on defence published in 1998 did not mention terrorism at all, and the 2000 
edition did so only in passing (Scobell 2005, 306).  	
The GWoT had a unique amplifying effect on the Chinese state’s construction 
of terrorism in Xinjiang. This took place in four interrelated ways. First, the 
government moved from a selective use of the ‘terror’ jargon before 9/11 to its 
blanket deployment to describe almost all instances of violence. As an example, the 
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Ghulja incident in 1997 was not represented as terrorism by Chinese officials, but 
described as a case of ‘beating, looting and destruction’ by protesters ‘trying to 
overthrow the political power of the people’ (AFP 1997b). Yet the Urumqi ethnic 
riots in 2009, an episode of similar nature in as much both began as non-violent 
protests (see Smith 2011), was blamed on ‘terrorist’ forces (Xinhua 2009).	 Second, 
the Chinese authorities opened up about the unrest in the region. In a new context of 
macrosecuritization of Islamic terrorism, China abandoned its reticence to publicize 
violence in Xinjiang, as illustrated in the official report ‘East Turkistan Terrorist 
Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity’ (Information Office of the State Council of 
the PRC 2002). The beginning of the document echoed the ‘universalist’ rhetoric of 
the GWoT: ‘Terrorism is a big public hazard in the world today, posing an enormous 
threat to the peace, security and order of the international community’. The report 
disclosed a series of violent events that had occurred in Xinjiang since 1990, most of 
them previously unreported. Notably, and this points to a third element of 
embracement of the GWoT, the Chinese government recreated past incidents of 
violence as cases of terrorism. An instance of this retrospective recasting (Tilly 2002, 
9) was the Baren incident (1990), represented as a ‘counter-revolutionary rebellion’ in 
1990, and described as a ‘terrorist’ incident in 2002. Finally, the Chinese government 
made the case that its domestic threat of terrorism had to be equated with the global 
one, accusing those who refused to describe violence in Xinjiang as terrorism of 
having ‘double standards’ (AFP 2001b).  
	




In the past, the Chinese state did not frame violence in Xinjiang as terrorism, even 
when events reflected dominant understandings of terrorism as politically motivated 
violence against civilians (see Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler 2004). In 
1992, an organization identified as the Islamic Reformers Party blew up two buses in 
the Urumqi, killing three people and injuring 23 (Reuters 1992). When a Chinese 
court announced the sentences for the crime, the attackers were described as ‘Islamic 
counter-revolutionaries’ (BBCMSAP 1995). In the GWoT context, violent instances 
of all types, purposes and dynamics are systematically represented as terrorism by the 
Chinese government. 
 
This section digs further into this contrast by exploring how two violent 
incidents were represented in the statements of government officials and the Chinese 
state media before and after 9/11.  Violent events are useful empirical realms through 
which to test the deployment of security narratives by political agents. As ‘catalytic 
events’, they provide state actors with the potential to link previously constructed 
‘unspecified threats’ to ‘clearly identifiable’ agents (Homolar 2011, 2014, 3-6). The 
respective threats of counter-revolution and terrorism, of which Chinese leaders had 
warned weeks before both incidents (The Straits Times 1990a; Xinhua 2013e), would 
have remained undefined had the Chinese authorities not specifically constructed 
these events as a ‘counter-revolutionary rebellion’ and a ‘terrorist’ attack. In doing so, 
they deployed their dominant security repertoire at the time of the events. 
 
Baren (1990): Constructing Counter-revolution 	
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While violent uprisings by Muslim populations are not unknown in the history of 
Xinjiang (see Forbes 1986), the Baren incident has a unique relevance for it raised the 
profile of Xinjiang in China’s national security agenda (Becquelin 2000; Millward 
2007). Violence erupted in this township of Kashgar prefecture in April 1990 amid a 
sensitive context for Beijing. Domestically, China had just witnessed riots in Tibet 
and the repression of pro-democracy protests at Tian’anmen Square, officially 
represented as a ‘counter-revolutionary rebellion’ (BBCMSAP 1989a). At the 
international level, the dissolution of the Soviet Union troubled the Chinese 
leadership because Kazakhs, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz peoples, linguistically and culturally 
close to the Uyghurs, were on the verge of declaring their own state (Smith 2000; 
Mackerras 2001). In Xinjiang, a variety of factors ranging from increased Han 
migration and unpopular family planning measures to a religious revival had boosted 
separatist sentiments amongst Uyghurs (McMillen 1984; Millward 2007). In February 
1990, Ismail Amat, Secretary of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, accused  
‘separatists’ of conducting ‘activities under ethnic or religious disguise’, warning of a 
‘brutal’ response to unrest (Long 1990a). A month earlier, Wang Enmao, former 
Xinjiang leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), had ordered measures to 
prevent a ‘counter-revolutionary rebellion’ in the region (The Straits Times 1990a). 
When violence flared in Baren, the Chinese authorities were quick to describe the 
events as a ‘counter-revolutionary rebellion’ (BBCMSAP 1990a), making Wang’s 
warning a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
   
The PRC narrative on Baren holds that the incident was a premeditated armed 
uprising. According to the state media, a ‘counter-revolutionary organization’ had run 
an extortion campaign to raise funds and recruit people for an anti-state revolt. When 
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their plot was exposed, the group acted on April 5th 1990, during a Muslim festival, 
forcing ‘ill-informed masses to make trouble’ (BBCMSAP 1990a). Local officials 
tried to reassure the protestors, who chanted extremist religious slogans, but were met 
with violence (Dinmore 1990; Reuters 1990a). According to a Xinjiang television 
broadcast, rioters ‘attacked the public security personnel who went to perform their 
duty, robbed them of their weapons and killed six armed police officers and fighters, 
injured 13 others and destroyed four police vehicles’ (AP 1990a). The next day, 
Chinese security forces put down the revolt, killing 15 rioters (Reuters 1990a).  
 
The official narrative gained traction, not just in China, where alternative 
accounts could and cannot be publicly articulated given the lack of freedom of 
expression, but also internationally. Millward (2007, 325) emphasizes that the 
incident helped to ‘sound Chinese alarms and perk up journalistic ears regarding 
Islam-inspired separatism’ in Xinjiang. Some Western media reported on ‘holy 
warriors’ brewing a ‘new jihad’ in China, and foreign diplomats suggested that 
Afghan mujahidin had armed the rioters (Long 1990b). Even actors that antagonized 
the Chinese state, such as Uyghur organizations in the diaspora, reproduced and 
continue to do so the idea of ‘freedom fighters’ uprising against China (ETIB 1991, 
1992; WUC 2016). In 2014, a militant group in Syria, with Uyghurs fighting within 
its ranks, claimed to be inspired by Zeydin Yusuf, a rebel leader who died in the 
Baren ‘jihad’ (Islah Haber 2014). 
 
Despite its resonance, the official account is not the only version of the 
incident. Alternative narratives, based on the testimony of local witnesses and 
travellers, and reproduced by Western media and international organizations, hold 
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that the episode started as a peaceful demonstration against restrictions on religious 
activities, which then escalated into a riot repressed by Chinese forces (Kynge 1990; 
AI 1992). According to this version, several groups of 60 to 200 Uyghurs had 
assembled in mosques to demand religious freedom the day before the riot. The 
Chinese authorities tried to persuade them to disperse, but resorted to the use of force 
on April 5th, after a public prayer in front of government offices (AI 1992).  
 
There is political agency in both narratives making sense of the events. 
Despite their antagonistic nature, both suggest that there was a prelude of negotiation 
between protesters and Chinese officials, and a final escalation into violence. These 
were plausible circumstances. Islamic proselytizing from Saudi preachers, which 
included the distribution of anti-Chinese leaflets, was not unheard of in Xinjiang at 
the time (AP 1990b; Dreyer 2008). In addition, social outrage was increasing in 
southern Xinjiang due to official plans to limit the number of mosques and Islamic 
schools (The Straits Times 1990b). However, the construction of the incident as an 
uprising by an armed jihadist organization suggests a vested interest in exaggerating 
the nature and scope of the incident. Particularly questionable is the armed dimension 
attached to the insurrection, considering that the rebels only had one gun, having 
seized most of their weapons from the police after clashes started (Millward 2007, 
327). At the same time, the construction of the incident as a case of repression of a 
peaceful protest underplays the potential violent character of some protesters. 
Violence against the Chinese security forces in the course of demonstrations was not 
rare. Only a year earlier, hundreds of Muslims protesting a book considered 
denigrating to Islam stormed government buildings in Urumqi beating policemen and 
officials (BBCMSAP 1989b). The incident was officially described as a ‘counter-
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revolutionary riot’ staged by ‘hooligans’ (BBCMSAP 1989b). Eventually, the official 
and alternative accounts of Baren merely differ on the what triggered the violence: for 
the former, this was the lynching of two officials by protesters, while for the latter it 
was the Chinese authorities resorting to force to quell the demonstration.  
 
Beyond attempting to establish how the events actually unfolded, the official 
discourse gained further political traction by constructing the rioters, their purposes 
and actions, and the threat they posed, and prescribing the policies to confront them.  
Here, CCP officials and the Chinese state media articulated four main arguments. 
 
First, they suggested that violence was premeditated by an organization with a 
dissident political-ideological agenda, and involved some form of cooperation with 
foreign actors. State media broadcasts attached a separatist and religious motivation to 
the rioters, who wanted ‘to oppose the Chinese Communist Party’ (Reuters 1990a) 
and to establish ‘a republic of East Turkestan’ (Dinmore 1990). Despite pointing that 
the incident was ‘not caused by either nationality or religious problems’ (BBCMSAP 
1990a), the official narrative represented the rioters as a ‘gang’ that ‘under the banner 
of religion, incited a religious craze, and wildly proclaimed the launching of a sacred 
war to eliminate the heathens’ (Dinmore 1990). Chinese officials such as regional 
chairman Tomur Dawamat also noted the influence of foreign ‘separatist forces’ in 
the turmoil (BBCMSAP 1990b).  
 
A second argument was that the incident, far from being isolated, was part of a 
wider, increasing conflict. The Xinjiang television network presented the riot as part 
of a ‘protracted, complicated and arduous’ fight against ‘splittism’ (BBCMSAP 
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1990a). Chinese officials also warned of an ever-intensifying conflict. Amudun 
Niyaz, regional deputy party secretary, pointed out that Baren was not an ‘isolated’ 
case and warned of a ‘very fierce’ conflict against separatism (Reuters 1990f). Ba 
Dai, member of the region’s CCP standing committee, noted that ‘hostile forces at 
home and abroad’ were ‘stepping up their infiltration’ and ‘national separatists’ were 
‘intensifying their sabotage’ (Tyson 1990). Meanwhile, the Xinjiang Daily 
commented that ‘backward religious forces’ were ‘continually expanding their 
battlefields’ (Reuters 1990d).  
Next, the culprits were constructed as the most urgent threat to the stability of 
Xinjiang. A government report produced weeks after the incident described ‘national 
splittism’ as a top threat to stability (Long 1990c). High-ranked officials echoed this 
idea. Wang Enmao remarked that separatism was ‘the major danger facing Xinjiang’ 
(Reuters 1990d). For his part, Qiao Shi, head of the Chinese security forces, declared 
that the CCP was ‘very concerned about stability in Xinjiang’ (Wo-Lap Lam 1990).  
Finally, Chinese officials suggested a two-pronged strategy that addressed 
both ethnopolitics and religion. Tomur Dawamat called for action against ‘splittist 
and sabotage activities’ (Reuters 1990e). He also pledged to ‘effectively intensify 
supervision over religious activities’, and to prohibit the interference of ‘outside 
forces’ (Reuters 1990g). The Chinese authorities demanded intensity in this campaign 
(Reuters 1990c). Amudun Niyaz called for using ‘every possible means to supply 
clues to the government to expose our enemies' evil plots’ (Reuters 1990f). 
Meanwhile, Kuerban Rouzi, head of the Xinjiang Peoples’ Court, ordered ‘strong 
measures’ against those committing the crimes of ‘counter-revolutionary murder, 
counter-revolutionary sabotage, incitement to armed rebellion, organizing and leading 
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counter-revolutionary groups and engaging in counter-revolutionary propaganda or 
incitement’ (The Straits Times 1990d). Rouzi’s speech encapsulated the relevance of 
the counter-revolutionary lexicon in the Chinese government's construction of 
violence at the time.  
 
Bachu 2013: Constructing Terrorism 
 
Unlike the Baren riot, a unique case at the time, the Bachu incident is part of a wave 
of violence that erupted in 2008 after almost a decade without significant violent 
events in Xinjiang. The wave started with an attack against Chinese paramilitary 
police officers in Kashgar and escalated after the riots in Urumqi in 2009.  In 2013 
alone, a total of 28 violent episodes were reported in the region, with 34 in 2014, and 
18 in 20151. Incidents have included organized attacks against police stations, clashes 
between the police and military forces and suspected terrorists in the course of 
counter-terrorism raids, riots resulting from the repression of protests for religious or 
social grievances, security operations intercepting Uyghurs trying to flee the country, 
targeted assassinations of religious or government officials, and premeditated 
indiscriminate attacks against civilians, mostly Han Chinese2. Under the GWoT 
context, China has conceptualized most of these episodes as terrorism, as the Bachu 
incident illustrates. 	
As with the Baren incident, there are official and alternative accounts of the 
events reported in Seriqbuya town, in Bachu (Maralbexi) County of Kashgar 
prefecture, on April 23rd 2013. The official narrative, echoed by the state media and 
the Chinese authorities, holds that the unrest occurred when three Chinese community 
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workers did a regular visit to a Uyghur house. There, they reportedly found 
‘suspicious individuals’ watching ‘videos from overseas showing terrorist acts’, in 
possession of a cache of knives (Yang 2013; Xinhua 2013a). The officers reported the 
situation to the police by phone while attempting to defuse the tensions, but 
individuals in the house attacked them (Yang 2013). Policemen sent to investigate the 
case were ambushed and killed. The attackers then tried to assault the local police 
station but were faced by a stronger police team, which gunned down seven attackers 
and arrested eight (China Daily 2013b). A week after the clash, the police disclosed 
some circumstances predating the event that would underpin the post-hoc 
construction of the violence as a terrorist attack. Accordingly, members of the family 
living in the house had created a ‘terrorist’ group and were plotting a ‘big’ attack in 
the future, for which they had prepared ‘long knives’ (China Daily 2013b). The cell, 
formed in 2012, had undergone ‘terrorist’ training and fundraising activities (China 
Daily 2013b). The official narrative was contested by alternative accounts reproduced 
by Western media. These versions, based on local sources, pointed out that the 
community workers were trying to enforce a ban preventing women from wearing full 
veils on a family that had had long-standing issues with the authorities over religious 
restrictions (Grammaticas 2013; RFA 2013c). Violence erupted when a community 
worker lifted the veil of a woman, a major offence considering the Islamic female 
modesty code (see Bellér-Hann 1998).  
 
As a catalytic event, the Bachu incident provided a platform for the Chinese 
state to deploy its terrorism discourse. Government officials and the state media 
labelled the rioters as ‘terrorists’, and conceptualized the episode as a ‘violent terrorist 
criminal case’ or a ‘terrorist act’ (Xinhua 2013c; Global Times 2013a.). Some 
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newspapers reinforced this construction with headlines like ‘recalling pain from day 
of horror’ or ‘timeline of terror’ (China Daily 2013b; Cui 2013b). 
 
As they weighed up the event, Chinese officials articulated the core arguments 
of the ‘three evil forces’ discourse (Xinhua 2013d). Firstly, they stated that the 
incident was a premeditated attack by a separatist and religious extremist 
organization. In this vein, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying described it 
as ‘a premeditated attack carried out by a violent terrorist group’ (BBC 2013). Hou 
Hanmin, spokeswoman for the Xinjiang government, zoomed in the radicalization of 
the attackers, claiming that they had trained for months, watching videos ‘from 
overseas’ and making knives ‘to use them for Jihad’ (CNN 2013). Dai Guanghui, 
head of Kashgar’s public security bureau, also suggested a pre-existing violent 
agency, revealing the group’s plot to launch a ‘bigger terrorist attack’ in Kashgar 
(Xinhua 2013b).  
 
Secondly, the incident was conceptualized as an episode in a wider, protracted 
conflict. Meng Hongwei, Chinese Vice Minister of Public Security, described this 
conflict as a ‘prolonged and complicated’ anti-terror fight (Xinhua 2013c). Zhang 
Chunxian, regional party secretary, also predicted a ‘complicated and intense’ fight in 
the ‘long-term’ (Cui 2013a). After the clash, Hua Chunying warned that ‘terrorist 
forces’ would keep trying to ‘sabotage Xinjiang’s stability’ (BBC 2013).  
 
Next, Chinese officials stressed that the violence had nothing to do with 
causes other than terrorism. Hou Hanmin affirmed that it was ‘a terrorist case where 
15 people were attacked and slain by violent terrorists’, denying any ‘disturbance or 
20 	
 20 
conflicts like those mentioned by some offshore media’ (BBCMAPP 2013). 
Meanwhile, and despite mentions to the religious radicalization of the attackers, 
regional governor Nur Bekri affirmed that the incident was ‘not about ethnic or 
religious issues’ (China Daily 2013a). 
 
A fourth argument posited that terrorism was an evil threat against humanity 
and the world now faced by China, as the incident proved. Hou Hanmin described 
terrorists as ‘the common enemies of peace-loving people across the world’ (Yang 
2013).  As such, she added, they ‘wouldn’t care about victims’ ethnicity or 
nationality, not about whether they were officials or members of the public’. For his 
part, Meng Hongwei highlighted the ‘anti-social’ and ‘anti-human’ nature of the 
attackers (Xinhua 2013c). Chinese officials also emphasized that terrorism was an 
international threat shared by China. Hou linked the events in Bachu to recent terrorist 
plots such as the Boston marathon bombings (Yang 2013). Meanwhile, an op-ed 
published by the Global Times (2013b) presented them as a reminder of the ‘still 
present danger of terrorism around the world’.  
 
Finally, the Chinese government seized the opportunity to prescribe an intense 
crackdown against terrorism and religious extremism. Meng Hongwei vowed an 
‘iron-handed crackdown against terrorism’, asking the police to ‘use every possible 
means to find and punish terrorists with no mercy’ (Xinhua 2013c). In a similar vein, 
Nur Bekri, advised to ‘leave no room for compromises and concessions’ for the 
terrorists (China Daily 2013a). Other officials linked the terror threat with religion. 
Shi Dagang, deputy governor of Xinjiang, asked for preventing the ‘promotion of 
extreme thought in the name of religion’ (Cui 2013c). For his part, Zhang Chunxian 
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called for stopping ‘the distribution of illegal religious information’ to tackle terror 
activities (Cui 2013a). These statements legitimized the crackdown approach that 
currently dominates the Chinese policies in Xinjiang, as the next section explores. 
 
The Politics of Counter-Revolution and Terrorism: Different Labels, Increasing 
Crackdown 
 
Put into an historical perspective, the flagship label dominating the language used by 
the Chinese authorities to represent violence in Xinjiang has visibly changed. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, the counter-revolution lexicon commanded the official 
narratives. This wording reflected China’s security discourse at the time, epitomized 
by the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (1979), which described as 
counter-revolutionary crimes those conducts harmful to the state and aimed at ‘over-
throwing the proletarian dictatorship and socialist system’ (Wong K. 2010). Amongst 
these, separatism was the ‘worst epithet’ to be levelled against dissidents in Xinjiang 
(Callahan 2004). However, the Bachu incident was represented with the language of 
terrorism, which reflects the post 9/11 franchising of the dominant GWoT discourse 
into China, replacing a now obsolete counter-revolutionary jargon.  
 
Yet while the language has changed, the main arguments underpinning the 
official narratives have remained constant over the years. Both episodes were framed 
as premeditated attacks organized by dissident groups advancing a separatist or 
religious extremist agenda. In both instances, violence was articulated as exogenously 
inspired, when not directed, by ‘foreign hostile forces’ or the ‘three evil forces’. Also 
in both occasions, the Chinese state discourse explicitly marginalized alternative 
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interpretations of what triggered the violence, notably potential frictions related to 
social, ethnic, or religious grievances.  
 
Some ideas conveyed by the Chinese official narrative have nevertheless 
evolved. This is the case for the referent object that, according to the government, was 
threatened by the violence. While the stability in Xinjiang and the unity of China and 
its nationalities were presented as values in danger after both incidents, the state 
narrative in 1990 zoomed in the threat that separatism posed to the CCP’s one-party 
state and its ideological tenets. The state media mentioned the ‘people’s regime’ or 
‘the construction of civilisation in the spirit of socialism’ as objects jeopardized by the 
unrest (BBCMSAP 1990a; The Straits Times 1990c). Meanwhile, Kuerban Rouzi 
affirmed that the revolt opposed ‘the Communist Party’s leadership’ and the ideology 
of ‘socialism’ (The Straits Times 1990d). In contrast, as the Bachu episode illustrates, 
terrorism is represented as a threat to humankind, and not as a risk to the socialist 
orthodoxy or the CCP rule. The legitimization of the crackdown in Xinjiang is thus 
pursued by framing the region as a front threatened by global terrorism. The Chinese 
authorities have therefore been very assertive in relating violence in Xinjiang to 
transnational groups like Al Qaeda or the Islamic State (IS) (Hindustan Times 2007; 
Cui 2015) or comparing violence in Xinjiang with attacks in other parts of the world 
(Zhang Y. 2015; Global Times 2017).  
 
Perhaps more significantly, the political response to unrest in Xinjiang 
advocated by the Chinese state was quite similar in 1990 and 2013. Considering the 
state of exception conveyed by the official discourse, a crackdown approach emerged 
as the logical reaction to violence. This crackdown is characterized by strict controls 
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on the practice of Islam, a core identity marker of the Uyghur ethnic minority. Right 
after the Baren incident, the Chinese authorities broke up 500 counter-revolutionary 
gangs and arrested thousands of people in the region (Reuters 1990b). In addition, 
they tightened the control over Muslim practices, purging the clergy, closing more 
than 200 unauthorized Islamic schools, and investigating up to 500 religious figures 
and 12,000 people (Fu 1992; AI 1992). New regulations were issued to control 
Muslim clerics and restrict religious education and materials to the official channels 
(AI 1992; AFP 1992). The reaction to the Baren events set the political stage for the 
following decade. In 1996, the Chinese government issued the Chinese Communist 
Party Central Committee Document No. 7, which described ‘national separatism and 
illegal religious activity’ as ‘the main threats to the stability’ of Xinjiang (HRW 1998, 
10-8). The directive called for tightening the control over religious practices, and 
encouraged a diplomatic campaign in Central Asia to ‘weaken the activities of 
separatist forces’ (HRW 1998: 13). What followed domestically was a series of 
massive crackdown operations named ‘strike hard’ (yanda) 3, which prioritized the 
‘serious and swift punishment’ of criminals (Trevaskes 2010, 397; BBCMSAP 
1996a). In Xinjiang, they were specifically driven against Uyghur dissidents 
(Bovingdon 2004, 22; HRW 2005). Thousands were arrested in the region, many of 
them executed on charges of separatism (Reuters 1996; AI 2001). At the international 
level, and following Document No. 7, China successfully managed to co-opt many 
Central Asian States (Peuch 2001) and other countries such as Pakistan (AFP 1997c) 
or Turkey (Shichor 2009) into silencing and weakening the Uyghur diaspora and 




Meanwhile, the policies applied by China in Xinjiang at the time of the Bachu 
incident are framed within a ‘people’s war on terrorism’ (Xinhua 2015). At this stage, 
the Chinese state considers the independent practice of Islam, as well as certain 
religious symbols, as indicators of extremism and terrorism risk. Amongst them, 
wearing burkas and niqabs, grooming long beards, wearing ‘terrorist’ clothing, or 
adopting ‘extremist’ Muslim names (Reuters 2013; Cui 2014b; Zhang X. 2015; RFA 
2017). Teaching religion or organising prayers in places not officially designated for 
that purpose continue to be persecuted practices (Cao 2014; Su 2017). China’s war on 
terror goes beyond disciplining religion, and also contemplates active secularization 
policies aimed at assimilating the Uyghur identity within the Han Chinese culture. 
These include the promotion, when not imposition, of Chinese cultural or patriotic 
activities among Uyghurs (Hayoun 2013; RFA 2016; Byler 2018), the encouraging or 
enforcing of Muslims to participate in the tobacco and alcohol sectors as either 
merchants or consumers (RFA 2015; Reuters 2015), or the award of economic 
incentives for inter-ethnic marriages or the abandonment of religious symbols (RFA 
2014a; Sun 2017). As in the 1990s (see Bovingdon 2004, 34), the crackdown is 
particularly concerned with party members and students. Party cadres are punished if 
they take part in religious activities (BBC 2014; Reuters 2014). Meanwhile, 
secularization and ideological indoctrination efforts are common in the educational 
field (Chang and Bai 2014; Global Times 2016).   
 
As a ‘people’s war’, the anti-terrorist drive entails the recruitment of the entire 
population in Xinjiang. On the one hand, the deployment of security forces and 
officials monitoring the enforcement of the crackdown has greatly increased (Zenz 
and Leibold 2017). These officials are punished if they do not show enough anti-
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extremist zeal (Gan 2017; Liu 2017). On the other hand, the government offers 
financial rewards to the population for providing tip-offs on violent plots or religious 
extremist conducts (China Daily 2013c; Huang 2017). The reach of this ‘hunt’ for 
terrorists transcends the Chinese borders, with dozens of Uyghurs fleeing China, often 
in groups of families, having been deported from countries like Cambodia, Vietnam 
or Thailand accused of seeking to enrol with jihadist groups abroad (Blanchard 2015; 
Meng 2015; Gerin 2014). 
 
The latest turn in the ‘people’s war on terror’ is an emerging structure of 
surveillance of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang. This includes the strict monitoring 
of people by confiscating passports, collecting biometric data, deploying CCTV and 
facial recognition systems, registering personal items, or tracking vehicles (People’s 
Daily 2010; Global Times 2015; BBC 2016; Li 2017; Bai 2015, Reuters 2016). The 
Internet is also heavily monitored, with severe punishments for the possession or 
dissemination of ‘extremist’ contents, the spreading of rumours that jeopardize 
stability, or the use of ‘terrorist software’ that avoids censorship (Tianshan News 
2013; Wen 2013; Wong C. 2014; Lam 2016).  
 
Conclusion: The Limits of China’s Construction of Violence in Xinjiang  
 
This article has put the Chinese state discourse constructing violence in Xinjiang into 
an historical perspective. As I have demonstrated, the contemporary articulation of 
violence in the region as terrorism is largely contingent upon the context of the 
GWoT. In 1990, the Chinese authorities represented the Baren riot as a 
counterrevolutionary armed rebellion, in line with the dominant security discourse 
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embodied in China’s first Criminal Law of 1979. Under the GWoT paradigm, violent 
episodes in Xinjiang are systematically constructed by the Chinese state as acts of 
terrorism with a global dimension, as the Bachu incident illustrates. Over the years, 
the Chinese state has represented violence in Xinjiang as largely the result of a 
dissident separatist and religious extremist agency linked to foreign political actors. 
This framing reproduces an endless state of emergency, and legitimizes a constant 
security crackdown in the region. The increasingly harsh repression documented in 
the region since the 1990s is the logical outcome of Chinese leaders vowing a 
crackdown that ‘should reach every village and household’ (Global Times 2014), or 
calling to ‘bury the corpses of terrorists and terror gangs in the vast sea of the 
people’s war’ (BBC 2017).  
 
Yet the discourse of terrorism in Xinjiang is limited and unstable, as it ignores 
and marginalizes alternative explanations of what causes the violence. For every 
official narrative depicting violent episodes in Xinjiang as acts of terrorism inspired 
by religious extremism or foreign hostile forces, alternative narratives emerge of local 
grievances triggering the attack, often related to the crackdown in place, as the cases 
of Baren and Bachu indicate. A caveat here is that there have been a number of cases 
of violence in Xinjiang that resemble what is generally understood as terrorism in 
academic and political circles. Horrific episodes such as the attacks in Beijing in 
2013, or Urumqi and Kunming in 2014, bear witness to it. These are episodes of 
premeditated indiscriminate violence against civilians, and portraying them merely as 
acts of resistance or desperation, ignoring the brutality of the attacks (see Rippa 2013) 
is a no less limited and biased interpretation than it is to ignore factors others than a 
political extremist agency of international ascent that lure behind most of the violence 
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reported in Xinjiang. Emphasizing the brutality of these specific events should not be 
incompatible with acknowledging that the protracted state of crackdown is a 
fundamental factor behind violent unrest in Xinjiang. A nuanced analysis of these 
events that replaces the uncritical discourse of ‘evil’ forces and ‘merciless’ fight may 
help deactivating the seemingly endless cycle of tension, violence, and repression that 
all Chinese ethnic groups continue to suffer. 
 																																																								
1 Author’s account based on monitoring the Chinese state media and unofficial reports from Western 
media and other organizations such as Radio Free Asia. 
2 Narratives of these types of events can be found, in order of mentioning, in Xinhua 2008; Yinan and 
Xiaoxun 2009; Oriental Daily 2013; RFA 2013a; RFA 2013b; Boehler 2015; Qiu 2013; RFA 2014b; 
Xinhua 2014; and Cui 2014a. 
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